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INTRODUCTION 
Sovereigns have a long history of defaulting on their debts.1 Despite the 
bitter lessons learned through this history, the international community has not 
yet developed an effective method for dealing with these events. There is not a 
single forum or mechanism that is mandated to help the debtor and all its 
creditors develop a comprehensive plan for resolving its debt crisis. Instead the 
debtor is usually required to negotiate in different forums with each of its 
different categories of creditors.  There are no formal mechanisms of 
coordination between these different sets of negotiations even though their 
individual outcomes are affected by what happens in the other negotiations as 
each group of creditors seeks to ensure that it is not being treated unfairly by 
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College of Law. Email: danny.bradlow@up.ac.za. The author thanks Motoko Aizawa, Juan Pablo
Bohoslavsky, Lee Buchheit, Matthias Goldmann and David Kinley for their thought-provoking
comments on an earlier draft of the paper, prepared for the 2016 Society of International Economic Law
conference. Needless to say, they are not responsible for the conclusions that the author has drawn from
their comments. The author also thanks Nthope Mapefane for her research assistance. 
1. CARMEN M. REINHART AND KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). 
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the debtor.  As a result, each sovereign’s debt restructuring process is likely to 
be conflict ridden, inefficient and to have a high probability of resulting in a 
sub-optimal outcome. In fact, the risk of sub-optimal outcomes has increased as 
financial markets have become larger and more globalized so that sovereign 
debtors—at least those with access to financial markets – are able to borrow 
from a broader range of creditors. 
One consequence is that sovereign debt restructurings (SODRs), as can be 
seen from the cases of Greece2 and Argentina,3 are difficult, often traumatic, 
experiences for the sovereign debtors and their populations and frustrating and 
potentially costly for their creditors. It is invariably the case that in a SODR, 
the sovereign, because it either has lost access to financing or can only obtain it 
on more expensive terms, will be forced to reduce its expenditures in order to 
try and meet its existing debt obligations. This means that it is entirely 
foreseeable that the sovereign’s debt problems will have a range of adverse 
economic, social and political impacts4 in the debtor country. It is also likely 
that the creditors will suffer financial losses due to the costs associated with the 
renegotiation of their credit transactions with a sovereign borrower in 
difficulty. There may also be losses associated with the delayed or reduced 
interest payments, and possibly reduced principle repayments that result from 
the SODR.  
The SODR therefore carries a high risk of having adverse human rights 
impacts on at least some of the stakeholders in the SODR. These impacts can 
include less access to health services, education services and other social 
services as funding for these services are reduced; loss of access to justice as 
spending on police, courts and legal services are cut; and job losses.5 On the 
creditor side, depending on the size of the loss and the identity of the ultimate 
holders of the debt, the SODR can result in job losses for the creditor’s 
employees or the loss of savings and income for pensioners and other 
bondholders of modest means.6 The net effect of these potential impacts is that 
2. Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt: Preliminary Report (June 18, 2015), available at
http://cadtm.org/Preliminary-Report-of-the-Truth; Margot E. Salomon & Olivier De Schutter, Economic 
Policy Conditionality, Socio-Economic Rights and International Legal Responsibility: The Case of 
Greece 2010-2015 (Legal Brief prepared for the Special Committee of the Hellenic Parliament on the 
audit of the Greek Debt, 2015); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the 
effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to 
Greece, A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 (Feb 29, 2016). 
3. Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Argentina, 1 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 465 (2006). 
4. Sovereign debt crises also can have substantial adverse environmental and social effects.
However since the focus of this article is on the human rights impacts of these crises, the environmental 
consequences will not be discussed. It should be noted, however, that these environmental consequences 
can have human rights implications and to this extent fall within the ambit of this article. 
5. Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, supra note 2; The Inspection Panel Report on
ARGENTINA–SEGBA V Power Distribution Project (Loan No. 2854 – AR), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ParaguayEligibilityReportwan
nexes.pdf; ECtHR: Koufaki and Adedy v Greece, Appl. Nos. 57665/12 57657/12, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=002-7627&filename=002-7627.pdf ; 
Abaclat et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case number ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (Aug 4, 2011), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0236.pdf.   
6. Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration
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SODRs will involve a struggle between the debtor and its creditors and 
amongst the different stakeholders on both the creditor and debtor sides to 
avoid having to bear more than their fair (as they define it) share of the 
financial losses and to mitigate the economic, financial, social, human rights 
and political consequences of the SODR. 
Given these high stakes, it is not surprising that efforts have been made 
over the past 70 years to improve the process. One recent manifestation of this 
effort has been the promulgation of a number of international norms and 
standards that either explicitly or implicitly are applicable to SODRs. These 
include norms and standards that are expressly designed to improve the 
efficiency of the sovereign debt negotiation and renegotiation processes such as 
the Institute for International Finance’s (IIF),7 “Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”, and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) “Principles on 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing”,8 and “Sovereign Debt 
Workouts: Roadmap and Guide” (Roadmap)9 and the UN’s Guiding Principles 
on Foreign Debt and Human Rights.10 
Interestingly, the documents dealing with the SODR process all recognize 
that SODRs have substantial social and political effects in addition to their 
financial and economic consequences. In fact, they all appear to accept that the 
parties to the SODR will need to take these impacts into account in arranging a 
sustainable SODR. However, they do not provide detailed guidance to the 
parties on how they should deal with these social and political impacts in 
negotiating and agreeing on a sustainable SODR. Except for the UN Guiding 
Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights and the UNCTAD Roadmap, 
which does so briefly, they do not discuss the human rights impacts of SODRs. 
This is surprising given the norms and standards that companies and states have 
developed for dealing with the social responsibilities, including in regard to 
human rights, of businesses. These norms and standards include the UN’s 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs),11 the Global 
before the ICSID: The Abaclat Case, 53 HARV. INT’L LJ 505 (2012); Stacie I. Strong, Rogue Debtors 
and Unanticipated Risk, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1139 (2013). 
7. Institute of International Finance, Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt
Restructuring in Emerging Markets (March 31, 2005), available at 
https://www.iif.com/topics/principles-stable-capital-flows-and-fair-debt-restructuring; Institute of 
International Finance, PCG Report on Implementation of the Principles (2015), available at 
https://www.iif.com/news/capital-markets-and-emerging-markets-policy/2013-pcg-report-implementation-
principles. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for discussion of these Principles. 
8. UNCTAD, Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing,
UNCTAD/GDS/DDF/2012/Misc.1 (Jan 10, 2012), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf. See infra notes 39-50 and 
accompanying text for discussion of these Principles. 
9. UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Workouts: Going Forward. Roadmap and Guide (2015),
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2015misc1_en.pdf; see infra notes 51-56 
and accompanying text for discussion of the Roadmap. 
10. Annex to Resolution 20/10 of the U.N. Human Rights Council, The Effects of Foreign
Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All 
Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/10 (July 
18, 2012). 
11. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. DOC. HR/PUB/11/04, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
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Compact,12 the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises13 and ISO 
26000.14 
The seeming disconnect between the developments related to the SODR 
process and to business and human rights is intriguing, particularly because 
many of the world’s most significant financial institutions have publically 
available human rights policies that, at least prima facie, are applicable to all 
their business operations and relations.15 Moreover, given the scope of their 
operations, they are likely to be creditors in at least some SODRs. In addition, 
the human rights implications of SODRs are sufficiently predictable, profound 
and adverse that one would expect that these institutions, if they take their own 
human rights policies seriously, would try and ensure that the SODRs in which 
they participate conform to their own human rights policies and to the 
international standards dealing with human rights and business, which are often 
referenced in those policies. 
The disconnect between these two developments raises at least two 
questions. First, should the human rights and business standards be applied to 
the SODR process. Second, if they should be applied to the SODR process, 
how should they be applied? 
The primary purpose of this article is to answer these two questions. This 
exercise serves three purposes. First, it will enable us to see if these human 
rights and business standards can add value to SODRs in the sense of reducing 
their human rights costs without unduly increasing their financial costs. Second 
it will provide some additional insight into how easily human rights law can be 
adapted to financial transactions specifically and to business more generally. 
Third, this exercise might help us better understand how to plug the gap in 
global economic governance that allows different actors in global governance 
to develop international standards on SODR and on business and human rights 
on parallel tracks that do not seem to communicate with each other. 
The consideration of these issues leads to three conclusions. First, SODRs 
would benefit from the incorporation of business and human rights standards. 
These standards would help SODRs reach outcomes that produce fewer and/or less 
severe adverse human rights impacts. This, in turn, should improve the legitimacy 
of the SODR outcome, thereby facilitating its implementation and enhancing its 
sustainability to the benefit of all parties to the SODR. Second the application of 
the UNGPs to SODRs indicates that the subject of business and human rights 
poses a challenge for human rights law. The reason is that the way in which 
human rights issues arise in the business context is often different from the way 
in which they arise in the relationship between the state and its citizens. As a 
 
 12. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles of the Global Compact (Jan 31, 1999), available 
at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles, see infra notes 83-88 and 
accompanying text for discussion of the Global Compact. 
 13. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (May 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf, see infra note 82 and accompanying text for discussion 
of these Guidelines. 
 14. ISO 26000 Guidance to Social Responsibility (Nov 1, 2010), available at 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en, see infra note 89-91 and accompanying text 
for discussion of ISO 26000. 
 15.  See, infra, notes 100-109 and accompanying text for discussion of the human rights 
policies of the major international banks. 
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result, the jurisprudence on the application of human rights principles in the 
latter context cannot simply be transposed without adjustments into the former 
context. However, we do not yet have the knowledge or experience to fully 
understand the nature and type of adjustments that are needed for this 
transposition to be effective. Third, the article will conclude that the lack of 
coordination between the international standards applicable to SODRs and 
those applicable to the human rights responsibilities of creditors is a symptom 
of a coordination problem in global economic governance. One consequence of 
which is an over-emphasis on financial and economic considerations in 
complex financial transactions like SODRs. 
In order to make this case, this article is divided into five sections. The 
first section will provide a brief overview of the key characteristics of the 
SODR process that are relevant to understanding the human rights impacts of 
these transactions. The second section will describe the various international 
norms and standards applicable to SODRs. The third section will describe the 
primary international standards applicable to the issue of business and human 
rights. The fourth section will consider the applicability of the UNGPs to 
SODRs. The final section is the conclusion. 
I. SOME RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE SODR PROCESS 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on how sovereign debtors and 
financial institutions that extend credit to them currently deal with human rights 
issues in SODRs. It is not to give a comprehensive overview of SODRs.16 In 
order to place the issue of SODR’s human rights impacts in context, the focus 
of this section is on the planning and negotiating process in SODRs. It will not 
discuss in any detail the role that international financial institutions like the 
IMF or bilateral creditors play in the SODR process,17 the many financial and 
economic factors that may influence the ultimate results of the SODR process 
or the many important contractual issues that can arise in SODRs.18 
In order to place the points made below in context it is useful to give a 
brief overview of the current approach to the SODR process. The usual SODR 
involves a number of different debtor-creditor negotiations. The debtor will 
negotiate with its official bilateral creditors in the Paris Club, an informal 
forum, housed within the French Treasury.19 It is possible that there may be 
 
 16. See generally SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT (Rosa M. Lastra and Lee C. Buccheit eds., 
2014) (providing an overview of the legal and other issues involved in SODRs).  
 17. It should be noted that the multilateral development banks and bilateral official creditors 
can be important actors in many SODRs, particularly in the case of low income countries. 
 18. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000); Matthias Goldmann, Human Rights and Sovereign Debt 
Workouts, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 79 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky 
& J. Letnar Cernic eds., 2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An 
Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV. BUSINESS L. REV. (2012); Francois Gianviti et al., A European 




 19. The Paris Club, which is informal in the sense that it has no independent legal identity, is a 
grouping of official creditors who meet with sovereign debtors in difficulty to renegotiate their debts to 
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some official creditors who are not part of the Paris Club and with whom the 
debtor will need to negotiate separately. 
The sovereign debtor will negotiate with its commercial creditors in one 
or more forums.20 For example, it may negotiate with its bond holders in one 
forum, often informally referred to as “the London Club”, its commercial bank 
creditors in a separate forum and with companies to whom it has outstanding 
debts on goods and services that it has purchased or to whom it owes payments 
for items such as royalties or dividends in another forum, in which the various 
companies either participate collectively or in sub-groups or it may negotiate 
with them individually. The creditors in these different forums are likely to 
seek to ensure, at least to the extent of their bargaining power, that the debtor 
treats them all more or less equivalently.21 It is also possible that the 
agreements reached in some of these negotiating forums are not comprehensive 
in the sense that not all creditors eligible to participate in the particular forum 
sign the agreement reached in that forum. In this case, the debtor can be forced 
into a second set of negotiations, or, for example as happened in Argentina,22 
into litigation with these disgruntled creditors. In most circumstances the 
multilateral official creditors of the debtor, such as the multilateral 
development banks or the International Monetary Fund, do not participate as 
creditors in the SODR.23 The reason for this is that by custom they have 
preferred creditor status and so their debts are not included in the SODR.24 
Their contribution to the SODR process typically is to provide financial and 
technical support to the sovereign debtor during the SODR. 
 
these official creditors. The creditors and the debtor agree, in an Agreed Minute, on the general terms on 
which all qualifying official debts shall be renegotiated. Each official creditor then concludes its own 
bilateral agreement with the sovereign debtor based on the terms in the Agreed Minute. There are 
currently 20 countries whose official financial agencies, such as their export credit agencies and their aid 
agencies, participate as permanent participants in the Paris Club. Other countries and their agencies can 
participate on an ad hoc basis in the negotiations for a particular debtor country.  See generally 
http://www.clubdeparis.org; MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21482, THE PARIS CLUB 
AND INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF (2004); THOMAS CALLAGHY, INNOVATION IN THE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
REGIME: FROM THE PARIS CLUB TO ENHANCED HIPC AND BEYOND (2004). 
 20. Raman Uppal & Cynthia Van Hulle, Sovereign Debt and the London Club: A 
Precommitment Device for Limiting Punishment for Default, 21 JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 741 
(1997); Giovanni Vitale, Multilateral Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Paris Club and the London 
Club, in CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUT FORS SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 122 (Barry 
Eichengreen & Richard Portes eds., 1995); Udaibir Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph 
Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/12/203, 2012). 
 21. SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT, supra note 16; Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L. J. 1317 (2002); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. 
Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L. J. 869 (2004); Gregory 
Makoff & Robert Kahn, Sovereign Bond Reform – Implementing the New ICMA Pari Passu and 
Collective Action Clause (CIGI Papers, 2015), available at 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no_56.pdf. 
 22. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) 
(granting preliminary injunction); NML Capital, Ltd. V. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 264 (2d Cir. 2012); 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ 6978 (TPG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167272 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 21, 2012); Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 23. Emine Boz, Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors, and the IFIs, 83 J. OF INT’L 
ECONOMICS 70 (2011). It should be noted that there have been occasions, for example during the HIPC 
initiative, in which these institutions did agree to participate as creditors and to reduce the debt owed to 
them by their sovereign borrowers. 
 24. William Wilson Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best 
Interest of Creditors, 57 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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There are a few points that need to be highlighted in order to understand 
the treatment of human rights issues in the SODR process: 
First, the creditors maintain that the sovereign freely assumed its debt 
obligations and promised to meet all its promises in regard to repayment. The 
fact that it is no longer living up to its promises, particularly when it has 
financial resources available,25 is a choice for which it and its citizens must 
accept the consequences. From the creditors’ position, this is not unfair because 
the debtor broke its promise to repay and there is no reason why the creditor 
and its stakeholders should have to bear the cost of this breach of its 
obligations.  On the other hand, the citizens of the debtor country may contend 
that they were not expressly consulted by their government about the debts and 
the risks associated with taking on those debts. Consequently, they may not 
understand why they, rather than the creditors who did assume the risks 
associated with making the loan, should be expected to make sacrifices in order 
to meet the demands of the creditors. 
Second, as indicated above, there is no formal independent mechanism 
that sovereign borrowers and their financial institution creditors can utilize 
during a SODR. This means that there is no third party entity that can help the 
sovereign debtor and the creditors reach a mutually acceptable agreement and 
then monitor and enforce the SODR.26 Instead, the parties have to form and 
manage their own negotiating forums. Thus, the overall outcome of the 
negotiations in each of these forums and of the overall SODR is likely to 
depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties and their need to reach 
an agreement without any offsetting third party to try and ensure some balance 
in the negotiations. The uncertainty resulting from the sovereign’s inability to 
fully service its debts gives both parties an incentive to reach agreement as 
quickly as possible. However, normally the sovereign has a greater need to 
resolve its situation than its creditors. This reality tilts the balance of bargaining 
power, in most SODRs, in favor of the creditors.27 
 
 25. In most cases the sovereign debtor will have some financial resources, although not 
enough to meet all its financial commitments. Consequently, the creditors will contend that the decision 
not to meet its debt obligation is a choice in the sense that it is deciding to allocate its funds for purposes 
other than debt servicing. 
 26. The international community has periodically attempted to establish such a third party 
mechanism. See generally, Martin Guzman, José A. Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Creating a 
Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring that Works, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO 
RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (Martin Guzman et al. eds., 2016). There have been two such efforts 
this century. See Eric Helleiner, The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, 
27 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 91-113 (2008). In the early 2000s, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) explored the feasibility of creating a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism and 
concluded that it was not possible. See Anne O. Kreuger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring (IMF, 2002), avaiable at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf. 
More recently, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the creation of such 
a mechanism. This effort has resulted in a set of U.N. principles to guide the structuring of such a 
mechanism and a working group to consider its creation but not in an actual agreement to establish such 
a mechanism. See G.A. Res. 69/319 (Sept. 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/319. 
 27. The IMF has indicated that in some cases it will be willing to lend into arrears, which may 
restore some balance to the distribution of bargaining power. See generally, IMF, Policy on Lending into 
Arrears to Private Creditors (June 14, 1999), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/lending.pdf; IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to 
Private Creditors—Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion (July 30, 2002), available at 
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In light of the failure to reach agreement on the establishment of a formal 
independent sovereign debt restructuring mechanism,28 the international 
community has used two different approaches, which are not mutually 
exclusive, to try and improve the SODR process. One strategy has been to 
adjust the contractual arrangements between debtors and creditors so that they 
provide for more efficient SODRs. The primary fruits of these efforts are the 
incorporation of collective action clauses and revised pari passu clauses in 
sovereign debt financing agreements.29 The collective action clauses make it 
harder for small groups of recalcitrant creditors to block SODR agreements 
between the debtors and creditors. The revised pari passu clauses are intended 
to reduce the chances for success of claims like those made by the hold out 
creditors in the Argentinian litigation.30  The second approach has been to 
develop standards that are designed to establish more efficient ground rules for 
the negotiation and renegotiation of sovereign debt. This second approach is 
discussed in detail in the next section of this paper. 
Third, the balance of bargaining power is also affected by the fact that 
both parties understand that the borrower’s situation is likely to continue 
deteriorating until an agreement is reached. Consequently, delay in reaching an 
agreement may increase the potential costs of the SODR to both creditors and 
debtor. This places both parties under time pressure and it inevitably means that 
any requirement that the parties collect new data in order to gain new insights 
and a better understanding of the borrower’s situation has a cost for all 
stakeholders in the SODR. It thus creates a disincentive for the parties to add 
new steps to the SODR process, even if they do result in a more informed 
SODR outcome. 
Fourth, by definition, in a SODR, the sovereign debtor does not have 
enough financing to meet all its financial commitments.31 This does not 
necessarily mean that the sovereign has no foreign exchange. In fact, in most 
cases the sovereign will have access to some financing but probably not enough 
to meet all its commitments to its citizens and its creditors. The result is that it 
 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.pdf; IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring – recent 
developments and implications for the fund’s legal and policy framework (Apr 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf. 
 28. See supra note 26. 
 29. Lee C. Buchheit et al., supra note 21; Skylar Brooks & Domenico Lombardi, Governing 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Through Regulatory Standards, 6 JOURNAL OF GLOBALIZATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 287 (2016); Roberto Blanco, Simon Brennan & Ian W. Marsh, An Empirical Analysis of 
the Dynamic Relation between Investment Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps, 60 THE JOURNAL OF 
FINANCE 2255 (2005); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, supra note 21. 
 30. See supra note 22. 
 31. The tight constraints within which the sovereign has to make these choices are loosened to 
the extent that it can obtain foreign exchange from international financial institutions such as the IMF 
and the MDBs. However, these resources come at a price. The price is paid partially in terms of the 
conditionalities that the IFIs attach to their funding, which, in turn, impact on the sovereign’s choices in 
how to allocate its foreign exchange. Once again these choices have social and human rights impacts. 
The issue of the IFI’s human rights responsibilities is outside the scope of this paper but see, e.g., Daniel 
D. Bradlow, World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights 6 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 47 (1996); MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2003). See generally, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. 
Hunter eds., 2010). 
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must make choices about how to allocate its available funds. These choices 
inevitably have human rights impacts that raise challenges for the sovereign’s 
own human rights obligations. To the extent that the choices are influenced by 
negotiations with the creditors, these choices will also have implications for the 
human rights responsibilities of the commercial creditors. 
Historically, all the parties to the SODR process have maintained, at least 
in a formal sense, that the decision of how to allocate the sovereign’s limited 
financial resources is the prerogative of the sovereign debtor. This decision is 
perceived to relate to its responsibilities as a sovereign and it is a decision for 
which it is accountable to its citizens. The commercial creditors should respect 
the decision regardless of whether they think it is a wise decision or is 
consistent with the human rights obligations of the borrower.32 This follows 
from the creditors’ obligation to obey all the applicable law in the debtor state 
and to respect its sovereignty. Within the constraints of these obligations, the 
creditors are free to negotiate any SODR with the borrower that they deem 
acceptable. 
Given the realities of the balance of bargaining power between the parties 
in an SODR, it is not tenable to maintain that this decision is purely a sovereign 
prerogative. The outcome of the debt renegotiation is a mutually bargained and 
agreed arrangement, in which both parties, in fact, have little choice other than 
to reach some sort of agreement. Moreover since the choice of how the 
sovereign allocates its limited foreign exchange has implications for the success 
of the SODR, it is not credible to maintain that the creditors merely passively 
accept the decision of the debtor and try to negotiate for the best possible deal 
within the constraints of this sovereign decision. Their negotiating strategy 
inevitably and intentionally influences the sovereign’s decision on how it 
allocates its limited foreign exchange. This suggests that the responsibilities for 
the human rights impacts of the agreement should be attributed to both parties. 
It is not reasonable for the financial institutions to place all the responsibility 
for the human rights impacts of the agreement on the borrower. This is 
particularly the case when the creditors are able to block the sovereign debtor’s 
access to international financial markets until an agreement is reached. 
Fifth, historically the commercial creditors have used their bargaining 
power to exclude certain concerns of the sovereign from the ambit of the 
negotiations. For example, the creditors might not accept as relevant to their 
SODR negotiations claims by the sovereign that its responsibilities to provide 
their citizens with adequate food and medicine imports should have a higher 
priority than payment of commercial creditors.33 This view, as long as it can be 
enforced by the creditors through their bargaining power, can result in the 
creditors demanding and receiving a larger share of the available foreign 
exchange than would have been the case if these other issues had been treated 
 
 32. See generally, Daniel D. Bradlow, Differing Conceptions of Development and the Content 
of International Development Law, 21 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2005); Robert 
McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 THE MODERN LAW 
REVIEW 598 (2007). 
 33. Julius Nyerere, “Should we really let our people starve so we can pay our debts?” THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 1985. 
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as valid considerations within the context of the SODR negotiations. The result 
can be to exacerbate the adverse human rights impacts of the SODR agreement. 
Sixth, the creditors often argue that, while they understand that the 
proposed SODR outcome will cause the sovereign and its citizens pain, the 
situation would be worse if the sovereign does not pay them what they are 
asking. The reason is that, in the absence of the proposed agreement, the 
sovereign risks being frozen out of international financial markets for an 
unduly long period of time. Ultimately, they contend, this will cause the pain of 
the SODR to last for a longer period and to affect more people, than would 
otherwise have been the case. In short, they argue, at least by implication, that 
although the deal they are offering is painful for the sovereign and its subjects it 
will cause fewer and smaller adverse human rights impacts over time than will 
the more generous deal the sovereign is demanding. 
The validity of the creditors’ argument depends on a range of 
assumptions about how financial markets and the other stakeholders in the 
SODR will react if the creditors’ proposals are adopted. In principle it is 
possible for the parties to assess the potential consequences of the creditors’ 
proposals and their impacts on the various stakeholders in the SODR. However, 
it is not easy to do so, particularly when the assessments must be done under 
time pressure. This means that any ex ante assessments are likely to be based 
on imperfect and incomplete information. 
Seventh, the SODR will be complicated by the fact that there is a 
bargaining process that takes place among the different stakeholders on the 
debtor side. In this process, for example, the different stakeholders in the debtor 
society will bargain with each other and the state over how to allocate the costs 
of the SODR. The most likely outcome of this process is that the more 
powerful stakeholders in the debtor state will use their power and influence to 
minimize the adjustment burden that they have to bear and to shift the burden 
onto weaker, and usually poorer stakeholders. This increases the likelihood that 
the SODR will have substantial adverse human rights consequences. 
Given the stakes in these internal negotiations, all the domestic 
stakeholders are likely to use whatever allies they have both within the debtor 
state and among other stakeholders in the SODR to improve their bargaining 
positions. The various groups of creditors risk being drawn into this domestic 
negotiation and, regardless of their responses, having an impact on the outcome 
of the domestic negotiations and thereby on the overall SODR outcome. This 
suggests that the historical view that the decision on how to allocate the pain of 
the SODR decision is purely the prerogative of the sovereign, at best, elevates 
form over substance. The creditors will inevitably exert influence over these 
decisions, regardless of how well they may camouflage this reality behind legal 
formalities. 
This raises the question of what consequences should follow from the fact 
that they are implicated in the decision. Increasingly, the international 
community is indicating that it expects the commercial creditors to behave 
responsibly, including in human right terms, in their lending decisions. The 
international community has developed one set of standards for guiding 
financial institutions in regard to their conduct in the SODR process and 
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another set in regard to their responsibilities for the human rights impacts of 
their transactions.  These two sets of standards are discussed in the next two 
sections of the paper. 
II. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO SOVEREIGN DEBT 
WORKOUTS 
The most significant international standard specifically dealing with 
SODRs, given that most of the major international banks are members of the 
IIF34 and are creditors in sovereign debt transactions, is the IIF’s Principles for 
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.35 This 
document seeks to establish SODR processes that are based on “. . . shared 
information, are conducted in good faith, and seek to achieve a fair outcome for 
all parties”.36 It stipulates four principles that should guide the SODR—
transparency and timely flow of information, close debtor-creditor dialogue and 
cooperation to avoid restructuring, good faith actions, and fair treatment.37 The 
IIF’s elaboration on these principles states that the debtor should implement 
policies that promote macro-economic stability, sustainable growth and market 
confidence, that the SODR is a voluntary process of good faith negotiations 
that should respect the sanctity of contract, and that the debtor should avoid 
discriminating among its creditors. The IIF contends that a process based on its 
principles maximizes the likelihood that the debtor will regain market access 
“as soon as possible under sustainable macroeconomic conditions”.38 It is 
important to note that the Principles include no reference to the responsibilities 
of the creditors to respect the human rights of the citizens of the debtor country. 
In fact, the Principles do not suggest that the creditors have any responsibility 
to take the likely impact of their actions on these citizens into account in their 
negotiating and decision making process. 
Another applicable standard is UNCTAD’s Principles on Responsible 
Borrowing and Lending. 39 These principles seek to offer guidance to both 
sovereign borrowers and their creditors on how they can behave responsibly in 
both planning and implementing their financial transactions. They make clear 
that the sovereign debtor and its creditors share responsibility for ensuring that 
the sovereign’s debts are sustainable.40 The UNCTAD Principles stipulate, inter 
alia, that the lender should recognize that the government officials involved in 
sovereign borrowing have a responsibility to protect the public interest;41 that 
the lender should make a realistic assessment of the borrower’s capacity to 
service the loan based on the best available information and due diligence;42 
 
 34. According to the IIF’s website, “[t]he Institute of International Finance is the global 
association of the financial industry, with close to 500 members from 70 countries.” Available at: 
https://www.iif.com/about (last visited April 14, 2016). 
 35. Supra note 7. 
 36. Id., Principle 11. 
 37. Id.,13-16. 
 38. Id., 11. 
 39. UNCTAD, supra note 8. 
 40. Id., see Preamble at 4. 
 41. Id., Lender Principle 1. 
 42. Id., Lender Principle 4. 
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and that any debt restructurings should be based on good faith and a 
cooperative spirit to reach a consensual arrangement as quickly as is feasible.43 
The lenders also have a responsibility, in the specific context of project 
financing to conduct adequate social and environmental impact assessments 
that are proportional to the technical expertise of the lender and the size of the 
debt.44 
The UNCTAD Principles stipulate that sovereign borrowers have 
complimentary responsibilities. Thus, governments have a responsibility to 
protect the interests of their citizens in their financial transactions;45 they 
should honor their financial obligations;46 they should be transparent in their 
obligations, including to their own citizens;47 they should avoid over-borrowing 
and should manage their debts responsibly48 and debt restructurings should be 
undertaken promptly, efficiently and fairly.49 In the specific case of project 
finance, sovereign borrowers also have an obligation to undertake ex ante 
social and environmental impact assessments and should make their results 
public.50 It is interesting to note that these Principles do not explicitly make 
reference to either the human rights obligations of the sovereign borrower or to 
the human rights responsibilities of the lenders. 
UNCTAD has also issued the Roadmap for sovereign debt workouts.51 It 
provides an overview of the shortcomings with the current SODR 
arrangements, a set of principles to guide SODRs, and recommendations on 
how the SODR process can be reformed. In its discussion of the short-comings 
with the current process it highlights the fragmented and uncoordinated nature 
of the current process, the fact that the process cannot guarantee a fair outcome 
for either the debtor or its creditors and that the process is inefficient and may 
result in an outcome that is “too little too late”. It suggests furthermore that the 
process could be improved if it was based on a common set of principles.52 
These would ensure that the process is legitimate, impartial, transparent, 
conducted in good faith, and aimed at producing a sustainable outcome.53 
Importantly a sustainable outcome is defined as one that is based on a SODR 
process that is efficient, produces a debt situation that does not “lead to 
violations of economic or social rights or prevent the attainment of 
internationally agreed development goals”.54 The Roadmap’s concern with 
human rights is indicated in Section 4 of the document, which deals with 
restructuring terms and post-restructuring issues. In its discussion of its 
recommendations regarding sustainability, the Roadmap states that 
 
 43. Id., Lender Principle 7. 
 44. Id., Lender Principle 5. 
 45. Id., Borrower Principle 8. 
 46. Id., Borrower Principle 9. 
 47. Id., Borrower Principles 10 and 11. 
 48. Id., Borrower Principles 13 and 14. 
 49. Id., Borrower Principle 15. 
 50. Id., Borrower Principle 12. 
 51. UNCTAD, supra note 9. 
 52. Id., Section 3: The Sovereign Debt Workout Principles 19-24. 
 53. Id. 
 54. UNCTAD, supra note 9, Principle 5 at 24. 
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sustainability is a holistic concept and thus “requires going beyond merely 
economic considerations” and stipulates that “[r]espect for human rights, 
particularly socio-economic rights, and political risks need to be taken into 
account”.55 In addition, the Roadmap, in its recommendations for dealing with 
uncooperative creditors, suggests that the debtor should not agree to any terms 
that would violate the “economic and social rights of citizens in the debtor 
state”.56 
It is important to note that the Roadmap provides no guidance on how the 
parties should implement these recommendations on human rights. In addition, 
the Roadmap focuses on social and economic rights and does not specifically 
discuss civil, political and cultural rights. It also makes no specific reference to 
any international human rights treaties. This is noteworthy because the 
international instruments dealing with business and human rights make clear 
that the responsibilities of businesses extend to all human rights and are not 
limited to specific categories of rights. This observation is also applicable to 
SODRs which, like any business transaction, can implicate the full range of 
human rights. Finally, it should be noted that the Roadmap, even though it was 
issued in 2015, makes no reference to the UNGPs. 
In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding 
Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights (HRC Guiding Principles).57 
These principles are designed to balance the contractual obligations of debtors 
and creditors arising from their external debt arrangements and their obligations 
to respect human rights.58 The HRC Guiding Principles establish foundational 
principles for dealing with foreign debt and human rights that include the 
following:59 
• ensuring the primacy of human rights—all states have the 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of their 
populations and all private corporations have the responsibility to 
respect human rights; 
• equality and non-discrimination—states have an obligation to 
design and implement policies and programs that promote a 
“more equitable and non-discriminatory distribution of benefits. . 
.”60 and should conduct impact analyses to promote this 
principle, particularly in regard to vulnerable groups in society;61 
• progressive realization of rights—states are obliged to ensure that 
their external debt arrangements “do not hinder the progressive 
realization” of human rights and non-state lenders must ensure 
 
 55. UNCTAD, supra note 9, at 54. 
 56. Id., at 59. 
 57. U.N. Human Rights Council: Guiding principles on foreign debt and human rights, 
annexed to the Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related 
international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly 
economic, social and cultural rights, Cephas Lumina, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/23 (April 10, 2011). 
 58. Id., Section 1 paragraph 2. 
 59. Id., Section II. 
 60. Id., paragraph 12. 
 61. Id., paragraphs 11-14. 
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that their debt contracts with states respect human rights;62 
• minimum core obligations—states must ensure that their external 
debt obligations do not derogate from their obligations to provide 
“minimum essential levels of economic social and cultural 
rights;63 
• non-retrogression—states should ensure that their external debt 
repayment obligations do not lead to them adopting measures 
that impair advancements of economic social and cultural 
rights.64 
The HRC Guiding Principles also include a set of operational principles, 
which require the state to conduct a participatory and transparent needs 
assessment before borrowing and suggest that the lenders should conduct due 
diligence to ensure that the loan to the state will be used for a public purpose 
and will not lead to unsustainable debt servicing obligations for the state.65 The 
principles also specify that the key terms of loan agreements should be publicly 
disclosed by both the borrower and the lenders66 and that the debtor state 
should ensure that its debt servicing obligations are not so burdensome that 
they cause the diversion of states resources away from the realization of human 
rights.67  In regard to sovereign debtors in difficulty, the HRC Guiding 
Principles stipulate that, while the debtor state should honor its “legitimate” 
external debt obligations,68 it should renegotiate these obligations with the aim 
of reaching an agreement that “enables the debtor state to service its external 
debt without compromising its capacity to fulfill its international human rights 
obligations [. . .]”.69 
Two points should be noted about the HRC Guiding Principles. First, the 
HRC Guiding Principles deal explicitly with the human rights impacts of 
SODRs, as well as all other aspects of the human rights implications of external 
debt. Nevertheless, the HRC Guiding Principles are not specifically referred to 
in any of the other norms and standards relevant to SODRs discussed above. As 
will be seen below, they are also not specifically referenced in any of the 
human rights policies of the leading financial institutions, although many of 
them do make specific references to other relevant norms and standards in their 
human rights policies.70 Second, the HRC Guiding Principles, which were 
endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council less than a month after the 
endorsement of the UNGPs, are clearly influenced by them and their view of 
the responsibilities of corporations to respect human rights.71 
Finally, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted 
 
 62. Id., paragraphs 15-16. 
 63. Id., paragraph 18. 
 64. Id., paragraphs 19-20. 
 65. Id., paragraphs 36-41. 
 66. Id., paragraph 43. 
 67. Id., paragraphs 48-51. 
 68. Id., paragraph 52. 
 69. Id., paragraph 53. 
 70. See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (discussion of human rights policies of 
banks). 
 71. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 57, paragraph 9 and accompanying footnote. 
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resolutions dealing with sovereign debt restructurings and the need for a more 
effective and balanced sovereign debt workout mechanism. In 2014, it adopted 
a resolution calling for the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for 
sovereign debt restructuring.72 The Resolution does not make specific reference 
to human rights. On the other hand, it does refer to the UNCTAD Principles on 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing and on the need for the 
restructuring process to contribute to the fulfillment of the sustainable 
development goals and the progressive development and codification of 
international law. In 2015, the UNGA passed another resolution that sets out 
the basic principles for sovereign debt restructuring processes.73 The resolution 
includes recognition of the sovereign prerogative to make its own economic 
policies, and calls for the sovereign debt renegotiation process to be based on 
the principles of good faith, transparency, impartiality, equitable treatment, 
sovereign immunity, legitimacy, and sustainability. The resolution includes a 
definition of sustainability that states that the SODR outcome should preserve 
creditors’ rights and promote “sustained and inclusive growth and sustainable 
development”, minimize “economic and social costs”, warrant the “stability of 
the international financial system” and respect “human rights”.74 
It should also be noted that the IMF has also issued many documents 
dealing with sovereign debt restructuring, including proposals for a sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanisms.75 However, these documents do not mention 
human rights as a factor for creditors and debtors to consider in their 
restructuring negotiations. 
The common feature of all these documents is that they seek to establish 
processes for financial transactions, including debt workouts, with sovereign 
debtors that are transparent, based on good faith by both parties and will result 
in sustainable outcomes.  In addition, the 2015 UNGA resolution includes 
principles relating to respect for the sovereignty of the debtor state, equitable 
treatment by the debtor of all its creditors, and creditor decisions by majority 
voting. The resolution includes a definition of sustainability that stipulates that 
the SODR outcome should preserve creditors’ rights and promote “sustained 
and inclusive growth and sustainable development”, minimize “economic and 
social costs, warrant the “stability of the international financial system” and 
respect “human rights”.76 This definition of sustainability is similar to the one 
in the Roadmap, which states “Sustainability requires that sovereign debt 
workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable 
debt situation while minimizing costs for economic and social rights and 
development in the debtor state”. 
 
As indicated, only three of these documents mention human rights. They 
 
 72. G.A. Res. 68/304 (Sept. 17, 2014). 
 73. G.A. Res. 69/319, supra note 26. 
 74. Id., paragraph 8. 
 75. Krueger, supra note 26: International Monetary Fund, A Survey of Experiences with 
Emerging Market Sovereign Debt Restructurings, IMFs Monetary and Capital Markets Department 
(June 5, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/060512.pdf. 
 76. G.A. Res. 69/319, supra note 26, paragraph 8. 
216 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE [Vol. 41: 2 
 
are the HRC Guiding Principles, the 2015 UNGA Resolution containing 
principles on the sovereign debt restructuring process and the UNCTAD 
Roadmap.77 Although, the HRC Guidelines have been endorsed by the UN 
Human Right Council, it is not clear if they have had any impact on the 
creditors. As indicated they have not been referred to in any of the other norms 
and standards dealing with SODRs or in any of the human rights policies of the 
major international financial institutions. There also does not appear to be any 
evidence that they have been expressly used by sovereign debtors in SODRs. 
The UNGA merely mentions human rights in its definition of sustainability. 
The third document was prepared by a group of experts and has not been 
formally endorsed by states.78 Moreover, the Roadmap, which only expressly 
mentions the need to respect social and economic rights, does not discuss 
human rights in any detail, and does not cross reference any human rights 
treaties or other human rights documents, such as the UNGPs. 
III. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS DEALING WITH BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The most detailed and authoritative international instrument dealing with 
business and human rights is the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).79 It was endorsed by consensus by the 
United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. Its “protect, respect and 
remedy” framework has been incorporated into a number of other international 
instruments dealing with the human rights responsibilities of particular types of 
businesses, for example multinational companies, in the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines). It also been incorporated into some 
standards dealing with particular types of business activities, for example the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, developed by the 
extractive industries in the US and the UK and interested civil society 
organizations, and applicable to the security practices in the extractive industry. 
The applicability of the UNGPs to financial institutions has been 
acknowledged, as indicated above, by various individual financial institutions80 
as well as by groupings of financial institutions.81 In addition, it is the 
 
 77. It should be noted that in January 2015, the current U.N. Independent Expert on foreign 
debt and other related international financial obligations proposed 6 human rights benchmarks that 
should be taken into account in developing a multilateral framework for debt restructurings that build on 
the UNGPs and the UNCTAD Principles. However, these benchmarks have not yet been incorporated 
into any set of norms and standards applicable to SODRs by the Human Rights Council. See, Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky, Towards a Multilateral Legal Framework for Debt Restructuring: Six Human Rights 
Benchmarks States Should Consider (Jan 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/IEDebt/DebtRestructuring.pdf. 
 78. It should be noted that the Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing 
have been specifically endorsed by some countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon, 
Germany, Honduras, Italy, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Mauritania and Paraguay. See UNCTAD, 
Progress Report (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2013misc2_en.pdf. 
 79. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
11. 
 80. See statements by individual banks cited above, infra notes 103-108 and accompanying 
text. 
 81. See Thun Group of Banks, Discussion Paper for Banks on Implications of Principles 16–
21 (October 2013), available at http://business-
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international norm most relevant to the human rights impacts of SODRs 
because it deals with both the human rights obligations of the debtor state and 
the human rights responsibilities of the creditor financial institutions. It is 
discussed in more detail below. 
The OECD Guidelines are the oldest general standard applicable to 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). It is important to note that they are intended 
to provide guidance from states to MNEs under their jurisdiction but are not 
binding on either the OECD member states or their MNEs. However, the states 
are expected to encourage the MNEs in their jurisdiction to comply with these 
Guidelines in their transnational operations. They are also expected to establish 
National Contact Points, to monitor the implementation of the Guidelines and 
to receive complaints about compliance with the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines, which were originally developed in the 1970s, deal with 
all aspects of an enterprise’s relations with its host governments. They are 
applicable to all MNEs82 and so are applicable to all financial institutions that 
operated transnationally. They have been revised a number of times. The most 
recent revision was in 2011, when a new section was added specifically to deal 
with human rights. The new section is based on the UNGPs and it closely 
tracks those provisions of the UNGPs dealing with the responsibilities of 
companies. In order to assist financial institutions to meet their obligations 
under the Guidelines, the OECD, in 2014 prepared a guidance note for the 
financial sector on due diligence.83 It is intended to help them determine their 
responsibilities for conducting due diligence in their operations and in their 
business relations so that they avoid causing, contributing to or being directly 
linked to adverse human rights impacts through these operations and 
relationships. 
Another norm of general application to companies is the UN Global 
Compact.84 The Compact requires signatory companies to pledge that they will 
comply with ten principles, the first two of which deal with human rights. 
These two principles require signatory companies to “support and respect the 
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights”85 and to “make sure that 
they are not complicit in human rights abuses”.86 The four principles87 dealing 
with labor issues are also relevant to the human rights responsibilities of 
signatory companies.88 They require signatories to comply with international 
 
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/thun-group-discussion-paper-final-2-oct-2013.pdf; 
Equator Principles (June 4, 2013), available at http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/equator_principles_iii.pdf; Global Alliance for Banking on Values, Principles 
on Sustainable Banking (2009), available at http://www.gabv.org/about-us/our-principles. 
 82. OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, Article I paragraph 4. 
 83. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT, DUE DILIGENCE IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR - ADVERSE IMPACTS DIRECTLY LINKED TO FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS, 
PRODUCTS OR SERVICES BY A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP  (2014), available at 
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/globalforumonresponsiblebusinessconduct/GFRBC-2014-financial-
sector-document-1.pdf. 
 84. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 12. 
 85. Id., Principle 1. 
 86. Id., Principle 2. 
 87. Id., Principles 3-6. 
 88. A total of 8610 companies have signed onto the Global Compact; this includes 171 banks 
and a total of 905 financial services companies. Information retrieved from 
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standards dealing with freedom of association and collective bargaining, forced 
labor, child labor and non-discrimination. It is important to note that the 
Compact is voluntary and signatories are only expected to submit information 
on how they are implementing the principles to the UN. There is no formal 
monitoring or evaluation of their compliance, although companies can be 
dropped from the list of signatory companies if they do not provide the 
requisite reports to the UN. In addition, the principles are not very detailed and 
so provide significant room for interpretation. 
The third norm of general application, ISO 26000, is issued by the 
International Organization of Standards (ISO) and deals with social 
responsibility. This norm is also voluntary and can be used by all companies. 
According to the ISO, ISO 26000 “is intended to provide organizations with 
guidance concerning social responsibility”.89 The ISO does not certify that 
companies are in compliance with ISO 26000 and its website specifically states 
that the norm “is not intended to be interpreted as an “international standard”, 
“guideline” or “recommendation” . . . Further, it is not intended to provide a 
basis for legal actions, complaints, defenses or other claims in any 
international, domestic or other proceeding”.90 Nevertheless it has a detailed 
section on human rights that, like the UNGPs, deals with issues like due 
diligence and grievance mechanisms to address the potential human rights 
impacts of the operations and relationships of companies adopting ISO 
26000.91 
In addition, to these norms and standards of general application there are 
some that are specifically applicable to the financial sector. The best known of 
these is the Equator Principles,92 which is designed to guide the conduct of 
banks engaged in project financing. It has been adopted by 83 financial 
institutions in 36 countries,93 all of which are expected to prepare annual 
reports on their implementation of the Equator Principles. The Principles are 
modeled on the IFC’s Sustainability Framework, which provides guidance to 
the IFC and its clients on what the IFC expects in regard to assessing and 
monitoring the impact on sustainability of those projects that it funds. Both the 
IFC framework and the Equator Principles include provisions dealing with 
human rights, which, like the UNGPs, impose a responsibility on companies to 
assess the human rights impact of their activities. However, in both cases, this 
guidance is limited to the project financing context. Nevertheless, the Equator 
Principles can be seen as providing some sense of the standards of conduct 
expected from financial institutions when their operations have a significant 
impact on sustainability, including a significant human rights impact. 
 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (April 14, 2016). 
 89. See http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546 (April 14, 2016). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See ISO, DISCOVERING ISO 26000 (2014), available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/discovering_iso_26000.pdf. Interestingly for a document that is expected to 
promote social responsibility, the ISO sells ISO 26000 for a price of CHF 198, which effectively makes 
it unaffordable to many potential stakeholders that may have an interest in understanding how the 
companies that may adopt ISO 26000 understand and implement their social responsibility. 
 92. Equator Principles, supra note 81. 
 93. Id. 
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The one international standard that has been developed within the United 
Nations that is explicitly aimed at the financial sector is the United Nations 
Environmental Programme’s Principles for Responsible Investment.94 Its six 
principles are designed to encourage institutional investors and commit 
signatories to pay greater attention to environmental, social and governance 
issues in their operations and business relations. There is no explicit mention of 
human rights in these principles. To date approximately 1500 asset managers, 
investment managers and professional service partners have signed onto these 
principles.95 
UNGPs 
The UNGPs, which were endorsed by consensus by the state members of 
the UN Human Rights Council, are applicable to all businesses, including 
financial institutions, and to all states. This non-binding instrument is based on 
the following three propositions:96 
 
1) Under existing human rights law, states have an obligation to respect, 
protect and fulfill the human rights of their citizens. 
2) Business enterprises have a responsibility to comply with all applicable 
law and to respect the human rights of those individuals that are impacted 
by their operations. 
3) There need to be appropriate remedies available to all who are harmed by 
the failure of states and companies to live up to their respective 
obligations and responsibilities. 
 
Based on these propositions, the UNGPs consist of thirty-one principles 
divided into three pillars. The first pillar, which consists of ten principles, 
focuses on the state duty to protect human rights.97 It stipulates that the state 
must protect against human rights being abused by third parties including 
business enterprises that are subject to its jurisdiction. In furtherance of this 
obligation, states must take steps to prevent human rights violations through 
their policies, legislation and regulations. They should also clearly set out their 
expectations of the business enterprises operating in their jurisdictions 
regarding human rights and, where appropriate, should encourage businesses to 
communicate how they address human rights impacts in their operations. They 
also have an obligation to promote respect for human rights by the business 
enterprises with which they conduct commercial transactions. 
The second pillar, which consists of thirteen principles, deals with the 
responsibilities of business enterprises.98 It states that business enterprises 
should respect human rights, which means that they should avoid infringing 
human rights and should address the adverse human rights impacts in which 
they are involved. It also clarifies that for these purposes, “human rights” 
 
 94. United Nations Environmental Programme, Principles for Responsible Investment (2006), 
available at http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/. 
 95. See http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories/  (April 14, 2016). 
 96. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 11. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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means the rights expressed in the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the principles set out 
in the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The 
principles also stipulate that businesses should have human rights policies that 
are approved at a high level in the company and are publicly available. The 
UNGPs also clearly state that the responsibility to respect human rights 
requires companies to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts and to seek to mitigate or prevent adverse impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations. It further stipulates that companies should have in 
place due diligence procedures to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for the 
human rights impacts of their operations. This process should assess both actual 
and potential impacts that are caused by the company, to which the company 
contributes or which may be directly linked to its operations. The company 
should communicate how these impacts will be addressed and be monitored. It 
is important to note that these human rights impact studies differ from 
“standard” corporate due diligence procedures in that their focus is on the 
impact of the company’s operations on its various stakeholders—workers, 
customers, communities—rather than on the potential risks to the company 
arising from the operations. Nevertheless, human rights impact assessments 
(HRIA) may be similar in methodology and may address some of the issues 
considered in a company’s environmental, social and health impact 
assessments. In fact, in many cases, the company can consider incorporating 
the HRIA into its environmental and social impact assessment.99 
The UNGPs make clear that the appropriate human rights due diligence 
process in any particular business situation will vary according to the size of 
the enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts and the nature and 
context of the operation. The nature of the enterprise’s response to the 
identified adverse impacts will also vary according to the severity of the 
impact, the role that the enterprise plays in the adverse impact, and its leverage 
in addressing the adverse impact. The UNGPs also make clear that the 
responsibility of the company is ongoing and it is expected to continue 
monitoring the situation and to keep assessing the adverse impacts throughout 
the life of the transaction or operation. It is important to note that the fact that 
the due diligence is ongoing, indicates that the UNGPs contemplate that the 
human rights impacts of the project can vary over the life of the project or 
transaction and that the company should continue monitoring and dealing with 
the impacts as they evolve over the life of the project. Finally, the UNGPs 
acknowledge that the company may need to prioritize actions to address the 
actual and potential adverse human rights impacts of its operations and 
suggests that it should first seek to prevent and mitigate those impacts that are 
most severe or for which delayed responses may make them irremediable. 
The third pillar deals with access to remedies.100 It stipulates that states, 
as part of their duty to protect against human rights abuses must take steps to 
 
 99. THE DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO 
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENTS – A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE OIL 
AND GAS INDUSTRY (2013); see also IPIECA, available at www.ipieca.org and www.humanrights.dk. 
 100. Equator Principles, supra note 81. 
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ensure that those who are adversely affected by a business’ operations should 
have access to either judicial or non-judicial remedies. The UNGPS also state 
that businesses, in order to ensure that grievances relating to adverse human 
rights impacts, are addressed as early as possible and can be remediated as 
directly as possible, should provide effective operational level grievance 
mechanisms. Finally, the UNGPs require that in order for non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms, including operational level mechanisms, to be 
considered effective they must be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, 
transparent, rights compatible, and a source of continuous learning by the 
company. The Principles also suggest that these mechanisms should be based 
on engagement and dialogue with stakeholder groups. 
It is clear from this brief description of the UNGPs, that there is no 
specific type of business or financial transaction to which they are not, at least 
in principle, applicable. In fact, a number of financial institutions have begun to 
express support for this view in their human rights policies, which are publicly 
available documents and in their public reports.101 For example, JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. states in its human rights policy that “. . .we acknowledge the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as the recognized 
framework for corporations to respect human rights in their own operations and 
through their business relationships.”102 Barclays, in its human rights policy 
states that: “We aim to operate in accordance with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as well as other international standards, including the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and International Labour Organization Core 
Conventions.”103 Goldman Sachs, states in its policy that: “As a global 
financial institution, Goldman Sachs recognizes and takes seriously its 
responsibility to help protect, preserve and promote human rights around the 
world.”104 HSBC states in its human rights policy that: “HSBC is guided by the 
International Bill of Human Rights and supports the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the 
International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. . . . The UN Guiding Principles state that all private enterprises 
hold an equal responsibility to respect human rights. HSBC is committed to 
respecting human rights”.105 Deutsche Bank states in its Corporate 
Responsibility Report for 2014 at p34: “We are committed to respecting human 
rights, in accordance with our values and beliefs . . . and as a signatory to the 
 
 101. It should be noted that not all banks have human rights policies or include human rights 
statements in their reports on sustainability and corporate social responsibility. For example leading 
Asian institutions such as Mizuho Bank Ltd., Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, and ICICI Bank Ltd do 
not have explicit human rights policies. 
 102. See https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/ab-human-rights.htm. 
 103. Barclays Group Statement on Human Rights 2015, available at 
https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/Citizenship/Policy-Positions/barclays-
statement-human-rights.pdf. 
 104. See Goldman Sachs statement on Human Rights, available at 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/corporate-governance/corporate-governance-
documents/human-rights-statement.pdf. 
 105. HSBC Statement on Human Rights 2015, available at 
http://www.hsbc.com/~/media/hsbc-com/citizenship/our-values/pdfs/150930-hsbc-statement-on-human-
rights. 
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UN Global Compact. Our policies and guidelines reflect our commitment to the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”106 
Banks are not the only financial institutions to have stated that it is their 
policy to respect human rights in their operations. Insurance companies have 
made similar statements. For example, Allianz states in its 2014 Sustainability 
Report that:  
[R]especting human rights is not just an issue for states and governments today. 
Companies from all industries have an increasing responsibility to incorporate 
human rights issues into their business standards, wherever and however they 
operate. . . .Corporations are not only expected to take into consideration the human 
rights impacts directly caused by their own activities and operations, but also those 
linked to a business relationship with business partners. The latter makes the 
determination of the appropriate action more complex, as the link is only through 
the business relationship. Corporations must look at human rights not only from a 
business risk perspective, but also from the perspective of the people impacted, the 
“rights-holders.107 
In fact, of the 38 financial institutions represented on the Board of 
Trustees of the IIF, 30 have human rights policies that include similar 
statements to the ones cited above.108 All the institutions cited above except 
Barclays are represented on the IIF Board. Moreover, 21 of the 30 globally 
significant financial institutions (GSIFIs) have human rights policies that 
specifically refer to at least some of the applicable human rights norms and 
standards. In fact, eight GSIFIs specifically express support for the UNGPs in 
their human rights policies.109 Another GSIFI has a public statement that 
indicates that it accepts that it has human rights responsibilities but it does not 
expressly refer to any of the applicable human rights norms and standards and 
two other GSIFIs do not have human rights policies but have signed the UN 
Global Compact.110 
 
 106. See https://www.db.com/cr/en/positions/human_rights.htm. 
 107. See https://www.allianz.com/en/sustainability/sustainability_report_2014/special_topics 
/human_rights.html/. 
 108. The 30 financial institutions that have human rights policies are: HSBC, Credit Suisse AG, 
SEB, Akbank T.A.S, Swiss Re Ltd., Itaú Unibanco Holding S/A, Banco de Crédito del Perú, Erste 
Group Bank AG, Allianz SE, UBS AG, Commerzbank AG, Standard Chartered Bank, Grupo Santander, 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Citigroup, Deutsche Bank AG, Zurich Insurance Group, UniCredit 
Group, Aberdeen Asset Management, BBVA, Morgan Stanley, DBS Group Holdings and & DBS Bank 
Ltd, ING Group, BNY Mellon, MetLife, Inc., Standard Bank Group Ltd, BNP Paribas, Société 
Générale, JPMorgan Chase, Scotiabank; the 8 financial institutions that do not have human rights 
policies are: Gulf international Bank, Qatar National Bank, Mizuho Bank Ltd., Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, ICICI Bank Ltd, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, 
Bank of China. 
 109. The eight GSIFIs that express support for the UNGPs in their human rights policy are 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, UniCredit, Credit Suisse, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, and 
UBS. 
 110. Information is based on a review of the policies available on the websites of the GSIFIs, as 
defined by the Financial Stability Board. See http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-
list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf for list of GSIFIs. The 21 GSIFIs that have 
human rights policy are: HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank 
AG, Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs Inc., Morgan Stanley, Unicredit, BNY Mellon, 
Groupe BPCE, Group Credit Agricole, ING Group, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, 
Standard Chartered Bank, UBS, Grupo Santander. The GSIFI, which has a public statement that 
indicates that it accepts that it has human rights responsibilities but does not expressly refer to any of the 
applicable human rights norms, is Wells Fargo. The two GSIFIs that do not indicate expressly state that 
they accept human rights responsibility but have signed the U.N. Global Compact are State Street and 
2016] Can Parallel Lines Ever Meet?  223 
  
This suggests that, at least in theory, the UNGPs should be taken into 
account by the debtor state and its commercial creditors in a sovereign debt 
workout. The issue of what role, if any, the UNGPS should play in SODRs will 
be considered in the next section. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNGPS IN SODR111 
The issue of the potential role of the UNGPs in SODRs can be divided 
into three sub-issues: First, should the UNGPs be part of the framework that 
helps guide SODRs? Second, can the UNGPs add value to SODRs? Third, 
what do the UNGPs suggest that the debtor and creditors should do in regard to 
assessing and preventing or mitigating adverse human rights impacts in 
SODRs? Each question will be discussed in turn, below.  
A. The Role of the UNGPs in the SODR Framework 
First, I will address the question of whether the UNGPs should be part of 
the framework that helps guide transactions in SODRs. As indicated above, the 
UNGPs are applicable to all businesses in all their operations and business 
relations. This suggests that the UNGPs, at least in theory, should be applicable 
to SODRs in the case of states that have commercial institutions as creditors.112 
This supposition is strengthened by the fact that the UNGPs do not include any 
language indicating that there are exceptions to their applicability to all 
businesses and their activities. 
It is, of course, also true that the UNGPs are non-binding. This means 
that, in principle, both the sovereign debtor and its creditors are free to decide 
not to utilize the UNGPs in their SODRs. However, for both parties such a 
decision does not necessarily mean that they have no human rights 
responsibilities in conducting an SODR. The reason is that the sovereign debtor 
is bound, under international law, by the human rights treaties that it has signed 
and ratified and by customary international law.113 This means, since all states 
have signed at least some treaties, and most states have signed the two core 
 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited. The six GSIFIs that do not have a human rights 
policy or any statement referring to any human rights norms and standards are: Mitsibushi UFG FG, 
Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Mizuho FG, Sumitomo Mitsui 
FG. 
 111. It is important to note that the U.N. Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights are also 
applicable to SODRs. They are not directly discussed in this section for two reasons. First, as indicated 
above, they are based, in part, on the UNGPs. Thus, they impose similar responsibilities on both debtors 
and creditors as the UNGPs.  Second, the Principles do not seem to have gained any influence with 
financial institutions. For example, they have not been referred to in any of the human rights policies of 
individual financial institutions reviewed for this paper. 
 112. The UNGPs apply to businesses. Consequently, they would only be applicable to 
commercial creditors of sovereign debtors. This means that the discussion in this section is unlikely to 
be relevant to low income sovereign debtors who only have official bilateral and multilateral institutions 
as creditors. 
 113. See John Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and 
Judicial Character, in HUMAN RIGHT: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION (Bertrand 
G. Ramcharan ed., 1984); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, The 
Helsinki Accord, 14 ILM 293 (1975); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287 (1995). 
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international human rights covenants114—the Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights115 and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights116—that all sovereign 
debtor states have some binding human rights obligations. At a minimum, 
therefore, each debtor state,117 in a SODR process, will be required to respect, 
protect and fulfill the rights enshrined in the human rights treaties it has signed 
or that are binding under customary international law, regardless of its views of 
the applicability of the UNGPs to the process. This means, inter alia, it has an 
obligation to protect the rights of its citizens from any adverse human rights 
impacts they may suffer that are caused by third parties, such as businesses 
operating in their territory or that are directly linked to these businesses or to 
which these businesses are contributing. 
The situation of the creditors is more complicated. They are not 
signatories of any of the human rights treaties and, since they are not subjects 
of international law, are not directly bound by customary international law. 
Consequently, they do not have any explicit human rights obligations under 
international law. However, they are obliged to comply with the law in the 
states in which they operate. This suggests that, to the extent that these states 
have incorporated their international human rights treaties into domestic law, 
these companies will be required to respect the international human rights 
commitments of their home and host states. In addition, the companies may 
have assumed at least a moral commitment to respect human rights to the 
extent they have adopted their own individual human rights policies or have 
signed onto one or more of the applicable international standards dealing with 
human rights and businesses.118 As indicated above, a number of leading 
financial institutions have adopted human rights policies in which they 
expressly acknowledge that they have human rights responsibilities, and that 
these responsibilities are based on core international human rights 
instruments.119 Some of them have also expressed support for the non-binding 
international standards. These institutions have not indicated that their human 
rights policies are not applicable to any specific category of their activities. 
 
 114. There are 168 state parties to ICCPR as of 18 March 2016. Seven states have signed but 
not ratified treaty, 22 states neither signed nor ratified treaty. There are 164 state parties to ICESCR as 
of 18 March 2016, six states have signed but not ratified treaty, 25 states neither signed nor ratified 
treaty. Information retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
 115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) entered into force on 23 March 
1976, G.A. Res. 21/2200A (XXI), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest 
/ccpr.pdf. 
 116. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), entered into force 
3 January 1976, G.A. Res. 21/2200A (XXI), 993 UNTS 3, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf. 
 117. It should be noted that the home state of the creditor institutions may also have some extra-
territorial human rights obligations, including to ensure that their creditor institutions respect the human 
rights of the populations of the debtor state.  See Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations 
of States in the Area of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (2013) available at 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/mainnavigation/library/maastrichtprinciples/?tx_drblob_pi1%5Bdown 
loadUid%5D=23  (last visited April 14, 2016). 
 118. In the case of the financial sector, the relevant international standards are the UNGPs, 
Global Compact, Equator Principles, UNEP Principles on Responsible Investing, Thun Group statement, 
OECD Guidelines. 
 119. See examples supra notes 101-110 (dealing with IIF members and GSIFIs that have 
human rights policies). 
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Consequently, there is no principled basis on which they can claim that either 
their own human rights policies or those international standards for which they 
have expressed support are not applicable to SODRs. The failure to apply them 
without an adequate explanation, therefore, should result at least in reputational 
costs to these financial institutions. It may also, at least at the margins, provide 
the debtor with some bargaining leverage in their negotiations with these 
financial institutions. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the obligations and 
responsibilities set out in the UNGPs do apply to SODRs, at least in regard to 
the sovereign debtor and to those creditors that have voluntarily accepted the 
responsibilities of the UNGPs and have not expressly excluded SODRs from 
this responsibility. 
B. The Value-Add of UNGPs 
The second question that the parties must consider is whether the UNGPs 
can add value to their efforts to restructure the sovereign’s debts. There are 
several reasons for thinking that the UNGPs can add value to these difficult 
negotiations. 
First, as shown above, it is almost inevitable that SODRs will have 
adverse human rights impacts. This follows from the fact that the debtor does 
not have sufficient funds to meet all its obligations to both its creditors and its 
citizens. Consequently, it will have to deprive some of these stakeholders of 
resources—financing, goods and services—that they are expecting. These 
decisions of the debtor will have human rights consequences at least to the 
extent that they affect expenditures on such items as health, education, social 
services, the justice system, and unemployment compensation. There may also 
be human rights impacts if the debtor’s policies generate significant public 
opposition. The UNGPs, by providing guidance to states on how they should 
account for the human rights impacts arising from their financial transactions, 
can assist the sovereign debtor in ensuring that it adequately accounts for the 
actual and potential adverse human rights impacts in the planning, negotiation 
and implementation of its SODR. 
Second, as indicated above, many of the globally significant financial 
institutions, which are likely to be participants in many SODRs, have publicly 
acknowledged that they do have human rights responsibilities. Moreover, a 
number of the leading financial institutions have specifically expressed their 
support for the UNGPs in their human rights policies.  It should be noted that 
these institutions have not explicitly stated whether or not their human rights 
policies apply to SODRs. In the absence of such a statement and given that 
their policies appear to be applicable to all the activities of the institutions, 
there does not seem any a priori reason to assume that their policies are not 
applicable to SODRs. The UNGPs, by providing guidance to financial 
institutions on how they should implement their responsibility to respect human 
rights can assist the creditors to understand how to structure SODR outcomes 
that avoid or mitigate the adverse human rights effects of their SODR proposals 
and of the eventual agreements that they reach with their sovereign debtors. 
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Third, the UNGPs, with their emphasis on due diligence and access to 
remedies, remind the debtor and its creditors that they will need to take all 
stakeholders who may suffer adverse impacts into account in their transaction. 
This is useful because, at least in principle, they will ensure that there are no 
interests on either the borrower or the lender side that are not taken into account 
in the planning and execution of the SODR. This means that the interests of 
those debtor country citizens who are adversely affected by the budgetary 
allocation decisions of the sovereign debtor should receive due consideration. 
In addition, it means that the interests of relevant creditor stakeholders, such as 
pensioners who are bondholders120 who may be adversely by the SODR 
outcome, should be taken into account. 
Fourth, history suggests that SODRs that do not pay adequate attention to 
the adverse human rights and other impacts of their outcomes may not be fully 
implemented and may need to be renegotiated. This can happen because, inter 
alia, the debtor is unable to implement the agreement as planned due to the 
opposition of domestic stakeholders or because the financial markets lack 
confidence in the viability of the outcome and so do not participate as 
anticipated in it. These developments may force the parties to renegotiate the 
restructuring, possibly under more difficult financial and more contentious 
negotiating conditions and at considerable expense to the parties. The net effect 
of these developments is likely to be that the adverse human rights impacts of 
the SODR outcome will also be exacerbated. The UNGPs can help the parties 
mitigate the risk of such a situation by making sure that they pay appropriate 
attention to human rights considerations in their first round of SODR 
negotiations. 
It should be noted that incorporating the UNGPs into the SODR also has 
a cost. This follows from the fact that the UNGPs add a new requirement onto 
the SODR process. They require the parties to incorporate human rights 
considerations, as determined through a human rights impact assessment, into 
the SODR process. As will be discussed below, performing an adequate human 
rights impact assessment under the time pressures of a sovereign debt crisis and 
in the context in which the outcome of the SODR is hard to predict ex ante is 
challenging. Inevitably the assessment will be imperfect and is likely to expose 
the creditors to reputational risk. This follows from the probability that the 
SODR will result in substantial adverse impacts for at least some segments of 
the debtor country population and from the fact that the sovereign debtor has a 
strong incentive to blame the creditors for the adverse impacts of the SODR. 
However, it is important to recognize that the creditors are likely to incur 
this cost regardless of whether it follows the UNGPs and conducts the requisite 
human rights impact assessment or not. The reason is that if, in fact, there are 
adverse impacts, the debtor and its adversely affected citizens will have a 
strong incentive to blame the creditors for them. Showing that they are 
complying with the UNGPs may help the creditors mitigate these risks. The 
reason is that they can show that they have taken human rights considerations 
 
 120. This was the case with some of Argentina’s creditors and with the holders of Puerto Rican 
bonds. 
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into account and that they have done so in conformity with the best applicable 
international standard. In addition, their human rights impact assessments 
might help demonstrate that they have worked to reach the least costly and 
most feasible, in human rights terms, SODRs agreements. 
The above suggests that on balance the benefits of incorporating the 
UNGPs into the SODR outweigh the costs. The reason is that the benefits flow 
directly from the UNGPs and cannot easily be earned from a substitute 
approach. The costs arise from the specific context of a sovereign debt crisis 
and, to that extent, are unavoidable. However, the UNGPs may help the parties 
mitigate the consequences of these costs. 
C. Debtors, Creditors and Human Rights in SODRs 
In order to answer the third question—what the UNGPs suggest that the 
debtor and creditors should do in regard to human rights in SODRs—each of 
the three pillars of the UNGPs will be discussed separately. 
1. The First Pillar: Duties of the Sovereign Debtor 
As indicated above, the state, under international human rights law has a 
duty to protect, respect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens. This duty 
includes the duty to protect its citizens against human rights violations by 
business enterprises. 
This means that the state has a general duty to protect its citizens against 
adverse human rights impacts that are caused by financial institutions, to which 
financial institutions contribute or which are directly linked to financial 
institutions. This duty includes protecting its citizens against the adverse human 
rights impacts that flow from financial transactions between the state and 
financial institutions. In other words, the state, in the context of SODR has two 
duties. It must ensure that its own actions comply with its duty to protect, 
respect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens. In addition, it has a duty to 
protect its citizens against the adverse human rights impacts that may arise 
from or be connected to the conduct of its creditors in its financial transactions. 
In regard to its own actions, in order to ensure that it is not failing to 
comply with its own human rights obligations, the state needs to determine the 
nature of the adverse impacts of its proposed course of action in the SODR. In 
particular, it needs to consider if these actions will merely result in slower 
realization of some or all of its subjects’ rights than would otherwise have 
happened or if it will result in an actual deterioration in some or all of the 
human rights of its subjects over the same period. Armed with this knowledge 
the sovereign debtor will have to determine what it can do to prevent or 
mitigate the adverse impacts. To the extent this is not possible, at least over the 
relevant time period for the transaction, it will have to decide what it can do to 
compensate those adversely affected for their losses. It is important to note that 
this obligation, if fully complied with, requires the state to make an assessment 
of how the individual adverse impacts will evolve over the life of the SODR 
transaction and also how the various human rights impacts will interact with 
each other over the relevant time period. It will also have to consider whether 
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either these individual or cumulative impacts will continue beyond the term of 
the SODR. This assessment may also result in the state having to make some 
decisions on whether it is acceptable to impose the adverse impacts on the 
present generation of citizens with the expectation that doing so will generate 
benefits for future generations. 
The state’s obligation to protect its citizens against human rights 
violations by its creditor counterparts means that it should not agree to a 
transaction that causes avoidable adverse impacts on the human rights of its 
citizens. 121 This does not necessarily mean that the state cannot agree to any 
SODR that has adverse human rights consequences, particularly when the 
exigencies of the situation leading to the SODR are taken into account. 
However, it does mean that the state needs to understand the human rights 
impacts of the offers made to it by the creditors and to assess whether these 
impacts can be avoided or mitigated if the offer is accepted and implemented. 
In order to make a fully informed decision in this regard, the debtor should be 
aware of the human rights policies of the financial institutions with which it is 
doing business so that it can understand if their offers are consistent with these 
policies and, if not, why the financial institutions are deviating from their own 
policies. Finally, the debtor state needs to engage in discussions with the 
creditors about the most effective way to mitigate the adverse human rights 
impacts of their transaction within the context of the SODR. In this regard, the 
sovereign debtor needs to make sure that its creditors understand the debtor’s 
human rights obligations and how it thinks they should apply in the context of 
the SODR. 
Within the context of SODRs, the state’s obligation to protect needs to 
include some plan for either restoring the ex ante human rights situation by the 
end of the SODR implementation period or for compensating those adversely 
affected for their losses. This requires the state to assess the evolution of both 
the impacts of the SODR transaction and the steps taken to mitigate the adverse 
impacts over time. It will also have to determine what to do in the event that its 
projections about the evolution of these impacts turns out to be inaccurate and 
the human rights situation turns out to be different from what it anticipated. 
This brief description of the state’s obligations suggests the most 
effective way to gain this insight, at least in theory, is for the state to do a 
careful human rights impact assessment of the likely human rights 
consequences of the SODR. As indicated in the UNGPs, although in the 
 
 121. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature 
of States parties’ obligations (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (Dec 14, 
1990), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (May 27, 2003).  Paragraph 10 of this 
Comment stipulates that states have “a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights…it must be noted that any assessment as to whether 
a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints 
applying within the country concerned. In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet 
at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every 
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations.” Paragraph 11 of the Comment adds that “…even where the 
available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to strive to 
ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances.” 
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context of the responsibilities of business, such due diligence is not a one-off 
requirement. Instead the state should continue monitoring and assessing the 
situation on an ongoing basis throughout the life of the transaction. This 
suggests that the state has an obligation to perform the HRIA in advance of its 
decision to enter into the SODR and to continue updating it through the 
negotiations with its creditors and then throughout the implementation of the 
agreement reached in the SODR.122 
There are two important considerations that the state will need to take into 
account in undertaking the HRIA. The first is that the advent of a debt crisis 
can happen quickly and can demand a prompt response. Thus, the HRIA must 
be done under considerable time pressure that is exacerbated by the fact that the 
process leading to the decision to enter into the SODR must be managed with 
discretion. If the news that the sovereign debtor is contemplating entering into a 
SODR leaks prematurely it can adversely affect the financial situation of the 
state, and thereby exacerbate the human rights consequences of the SODR. 
This suggests that the HRIA in the case of SODR is unlikely to comply 
with best practice standards of transparency and participation and detailed 
analysis in regard to such impact studies.123 This also means that there is a 
heightened risk of unexpected adverse human rights outcomes once the SODR 
is being implemented. This, in turn, underscores the importance of the debtor 
creating a grievance mechanism, a topic to which we will return when 
discussing the third pillar of the UNGPs. 
The second issue, as discussed above, is that a SODR almost inevitably 
will require the state to make budget cuts.124 The supposed justification for 
these cuts, which all SODR participants understand will cause pain and adverse 
human rights impacts, is that the society must accept some short term costs, in 
order to restore a sustainable macro-economic situation and to position itself on 
a sustainable growth path. This in turn is expected to generate future human 
rights gains. Assuming that this justification is correct, it amounts to 
concluding that it is acceptable to impose current human rights sacrifices in 
order to reap future human rights gains. It is unclear how human rights law 
should assess this inter-temporal human rights trade-off. Although, at a 
minimum it should comply with the requirements that retrogressive measures 
should be non-discriminatory, proportionate and should comply with the states 
minimum core obligations.125Evaluating this trade-off is further complicated by 
 
 122. In this regard it is interesting to note that the European Commission has done a social 
impact assessment of the stability support programme for Greece. See European Commission, 
Assessment of the Social Impact of the new Stability Support Programme for Greece, Commission Staff 
Working Document, SWD(2015) 162 final (Aug 19, 2015). 
 123. It is interesting to note that Iceland made an effort to understand the human rights impacts 
of its proposed SODR during its 2008 banking crisis. See Report of the Independent Expert on the 
effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to 
Greece, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 (Feb 29, 2016). 
 124. The extent of these cuts will be influenced by its ability to identify new sources of 
financial support. Many debtor states will obtain such support from the IMF and multilateral 
development banks. 
 125. See General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, supra 
note 118;  Goldmann, supra note 18. 
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the fact that the current human rights costs can be assessed with reasonable 
certainty but the future human rights benefits are uncertain and their scope and 
scale depend on the assumptions made about the likely future trajectory of the 
SODR and its impacts. In addition, the identity of the current losers can be 
determined with a reasonable degree of confidence but the identity of the future 
winners is less easily established. Moreover, there is no necessary reason to 
assume that the future gainers will be the current losers. This is particularly 
relevant because in the context of SODRs, human rights impacts in fact are 
likely to be cumulative, that is, for example, current cuts in education spending 
can have adverse impacts on the future health of the adversely affected learners 
and can have negative impacts on their job prospects. There is no obvious 
reason to assume that these currently adversely affected learners will benefit 
from future increases in education spending. 
2. The Second Pillar: The Responsibility of Financial Institutions 
The UNGPs stipulate that business enterprises have a responsibility to 
respect the human rights of those actually or potentially affected by their 
operations or business relations. It clarifies that the core of this obligation is for 
the business enterprise to engage in sufficient due diligence to identify the 
human rights impacts of its planned operations and to take steps to prevent or 
mitigate the adverse impacts. 
This standard suggests that the creditor financial institutions have a 
responsibility to undertake a HRIA before engaging with the sovereign debtor 
about the SODR. In addition, they should continue updating the HRIA during 
the SODR negotiations, and when it is concluded and is being implemented. As 
in the case of the sovereign debtor, the financial institutions are expected to 
undertake this HRIA under considerable time constraints and in conditions in 
which complying with high standards of detailed analysis, transparency and 
participation will be difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, as in the case of 
the sovereign, this situation places a premium on the need for providing those 
adversely affected by the SODR with access to remedies. 
It is clear from the literature on HRIAs that they are still a relatively new 
form of impact assessment and that practitioners are still working out the best 
way to do such assessments.126 Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics 
that should feature in any HRIA that complies with the UNGPs. Each of these 
is discussed below together with the issues they raise in the context of SODRs. 
It is well understood that in all impact assessments it is necessary to have 
a sense of the human rights conditions that exist before the parties enter into 
their transaction or operation. In principle, this should not be a problem 
 
 126. ISO 26000 supra note 14; Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 99; Oxfam 
Technical Briefing, A Oxfam Perspective on the UN Guiding Principles (2013), available at 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tb-business-human-rights-oxfam-perspective-un-
guiding-principles-130613-en.pdf; Oxfam & FIDH, Community-Based Human Rights Impact 
Assessment: The Getting it Right Tool (2011), available at 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cobhra_training_manual.pdf; DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT – GUIDANCE AND TOOLBOX (2016), available at 
http://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/business/hria_toolbox/hria_gu
idance_and_toolbox_final_feb2016.pdf. 
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because, pursuant to the UNGPs, the financial institutions and the sovereign 
borrower should have done HRIAs before they entered into their original debt 
transactions and they should be monitoring the impacts over the life of the 
transaction. In this case, they would have a good sense of the existing human 
rights situation before commencing the SODR. However, in reality, at least 
while the HRIAs requirement is still relatively new, it is unlikely that the 
parties have done HRIAs for all their financial transactions. 
Even if the creditors had done HRIAs of their individual transactions with 
the borrower, it is unlikely that they would have gathered information on the 
cumulative impacts of all the debtor’s financial transactions. This is because 
they may not have been involved in all the transactions and so would not have 
done, ab initio, studies indicating how the impacts of the various transactions 
interact with each other, either to reduce or increase over time the adverse 
human rights impacts. Thus, they are unlikely to be in a position on their own 
to make a truly informed judgement about the likely human rights impacts of 
the SODR. If one looks at cases of recent SODRs, such as Greece,127 it is clear 
that the cumulative impacts of these multiple agreements can be substantial. In 
addition, it is clear that understanding them is a pre-condition for assessing the 
likely impacts of an SODR. This suggests that there will be a need for the 
creditors and the debtor to cooperate in undertaking the SODR HRIA. 
In the event that the parties do not have a good baseline study, they will 
be confronted with a complicated human rights challenge. Both parties will 
know that they are undertaking a transaction that is likely to adversely impact 
the human rights of at least some of the debtor’s subjects but without a clear 
understanding of the scope and scale of the impacts or how they may interact 
with each other. They may also not have the information to determine which of 
the possible SODR outcomes would be the least harmful option for all the 
affected stakeholders. Moreover, they will lack the time to undertake the kinds 
of studies that might help them understand the impacts. The net effect is that 
they will enter into the SODR with imperfect knowledge about the human 
rights implications of their proposed actions and in conditions in which they 
cannot easily take the public into their confidences about the proposed 
transaction. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this situation is not that it is too difficult 
to apply the UNGPs to SODR. Rather, it is that the UNGPs need to be applied 
pragmatically. The parties should do the best HRIA that is feasible under the 
circumstances, understanding that they are unlikely to meet HRIA best practice 
standards. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the outcome of the 
SODR will be a negotiated solution that will depend to a large extent on the 
negotiating dynamics and the balance of bargaining power between the state 
and its creditors. This means that neither the state nor the creditors can fully 
assess the impacts of the SODR before an agreement is concluded. They will 
not be able to determine, with any degree of confidence the full range, scale or 
 
 127. Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, supra note 2; Salomon & De Schutter, supra note 
2. 
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scope of all the impacts until they have a clear understanding of how much the 
debtor will have to pay, over what period and subject to what conditions. 
Consequently, their initial ex ante assessments will be more in the nature of a 
list of likely human rights impacts, without detailed information on the scale of 
the impact. This assessment will need to be adjusted as their negotiations 
proceed toward the final deal. The factors that will influence their assessment 
of the human rights impact of the SODR outcome include the size of the budget 
cuts the debtor will have to make, over what period, what external support may 
be available to help deal with these cuts, how this may change over time, and 
what measures the adversely affected stakeholders can take to counter the 
effects of the cuts. This information will also allow them to more confidently 
assess the trajectory of the adverse human rights impacts over time. 
It is important to note that the HRIA needs to evaluate the impact of any 
proposed SODR on all relevant stakeholders and to assess whether the overall 
impact of the transaction on all these stakeholders is the least harmful from a 
human rights perspective. This suggests that there will be some situations 
where the financial institutions are contemplating transactions that may have 
irreconcilable, in human rights terms, impacts. For example if they pay too 
much attention to those adversely affected in the debtor country and take too 
generous steps to prevent or mitigate their harm, they may end up unduly 
impacting the interests of some bondholders, such as pensioners that count on 
the interest they earn as holders of the debtor’s bonds for their monthly income. 
This suggests that, at least in some cases, SODR is a zero-sum game and that in 
making their HRIA assessments, the financial institutions will need to assess 
how this game evolves over the life of the SODR. 
Needless to say, the parties’ assessment of these outcomes over this 
period will depend on the assumptions they make about the relative severity of 
the impacts on the different stakeholders, and the reactions of the affected 
persons. In addition, their estimate of the human rights impacts will be affected 
by their assumption about the time period over which the impacts will manifest 
themselves. If they assume too short a time horizon they may over-estimate 
certain adverse human rights impacts which manifest themselves immediately 
after the SODR is concluded and may under-estimate certain mitigating factors 
relating to these impacts that manifest themselves more slowly. Conversely 
they may under-estimate the actual adverse impacts if they do not allow 
sufficient time to assess how the adverse impacts interact with each other and 
to determine their cumulative impacts. This means that certain possible SODR 
outcomes could be seen as being more or less desirable depending on the time 
horizon used in the impact assessment. 
These issues and the complexities of applying the first two pillars of the 
UNGPs in the context of SODR, underscores the importance of the third pillar 
for dealing with the grievances that are likely to arise in the context of the 
implementation of the SODR. 
3. The Third Pillar: Access to Remedies 
As indicated above, there are substantial constraints on the ability of both 
the state and the creditors to undertake effective due diligence in advance of 
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agreeing a SODR. Consequently, there is a strong likelihood that there will be 
stakeholders whose interests have not been adequately accounted for in the 
HRIA of the outcome of the SODR. According to the UNGPs they should be 
given access to either judicial or non-judicial forums in which they can seek a 
remedy for this situation.128 Clearly in many cases, these stakeholders may, in 
principle, be able to bring their grievance to a judicial or administrative forum 
either in the debtor state or in one of the home states of the creditors. However, 
this can be expensive, time consuming and the result can be uncertain. 
Consequently, it is not clear if, in all cases, judicial forums will be able to offer 
adequate effective relief to all those stakeholders whose human rights have 
been adversely affected by the SODR. 
This suggests that in many SODRs there will be a need for aggrieved 
parties to have access to some form of SODR-specific grievance mechanism. 
The UNGPs stipulates that these mechanisms should be legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, transparent, rights compatible, and a source of 
continuous learning by the company.129 The UNGPs also suggest that in setting 
up the mechanism, the parties should consult affected stakeholders on its 
performance and design.130 Subject to these criteria, the parties are free to 
design and operate a grievance mechanism that best suits their purposes. 
A SODR-specific grievance mechanism offers the sovereign debtor and 
its creditors three benefits.  First, it provides the parties with a relatively 
flexible, informal and independent third party dispute settlement forum.  Thus, 
an aggrieved party, provided they meet its access requirements, can use the 
mechanism to have their claim for a remedy for the human rights harm caused 
by the SODR addressed by someone other than the debtor or the creditor. If the 
process is transparent and participatory, it should give claimants confidence 
that their claims have been fairly addressed and thus enable them to accept 
even an unfavorable outcome of the grievance mechanism procedure. This fact 
should also help boost public confidence in the responsiveness of the debtor 
and the creditors to the interests of all stakeholders in the SODR. This can help 
build support for the agreement amongst all stakeholders, thereby building 
confidence in the ability of the parties to implement the agreement. 
Second, this is a mechanism for dealing with the unintended adverse 
human rights impacts of the SODR.  Since these agreements will have been 
concluded under time pressure and in the context of a crisis, there is a 
probability that the parties to it will not take account of all relevant stakeholder 
interests. As a result, there is a reasonable chance that the agreement will have 
some unintended but adverse human rights impacts on some stakeholders. An 
operational level grievance mechanism offers these stakeholders a means for 
informing the debtor and creditor about these impacts before they become too 
severe. It also provides a way for the affected parties and the debtor and 
creditors to have a relatively independent third party deal with them on their 
merits. This can help reduce the risk that the unaddressed concern becomes 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Principle 31, UNGPs, supra note 11. 
 130. Id. 
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politicized and a potential threat to the overall efficacy of the agreement. 
Third, a grievance mechanism, as indicated in the UNGPs, can perform a 
useful lessons learned function. The reason is that the mechanism generates 
empirical data about the actual impacts of SODR agreements and about how 
they can most effectively be managed. This may be of greater benefit to the 
creditors, many of whom are likely to have to deal with SODRs in the future, 
than to the sovereign debtor—who no doubt hopes not to have to repeat the 
SODR experience. 
The benefits of the grievance mechanism are offset by two costs. First, 
the mechanism costs money to establish and maintain. An additional possible 
cost can arise if the grievance mechanism can provide compensation to parties 
that have been particularly severely affected by the SODR. 
The question is who should be responsible for providing these funds—the 
debtor or the creditor? The answer to this question can have human rights 
implications. For example, if the debtor has to contribute the funds, it will have 
to cut its budget somewhere else, which may lead to such adverse impacts as 
job losses, reduced access to health care, education or social security for some 
citizens or reduced access to the justice system. On the other hand, if the 
creditor provides the funds, it might provide less debt relief to the debtor, 
which could also result in adverse human rights impacts. 
Given, as indicated above, that the mechanism provides benefits to both 
the debtor and the creditor, it seems reasonable to expect both parties to 
contribute to the cost of the grievance mechanism. This would also have the 
benefit of enhancing the impression that the mechanism is impartial and 
independent. 
A second potential challenge is that the mechanism could be over-
whelmed, if individuals are allowed to bring complaints to the mechanism. This 
concern can be addressed through the jurisdictional requirements for the 
mechanism. For example, it could require cases to be brought by groups of 
individuals or organizations representing groups of individuals who have all 
been adversely affected in the same way.  Such a requirement would also help 
the mechanism identify the most substantial and urgent complaints, thereby 
assisting it in allocating its time and resources efficiently and in optimizing its 
positive human rights impact on the SODR transaction. 
The above discussion suggests that, on balance, the grievance mechanism 
offers more advantages than disadvantages to the SODR. This impression 
follows from the fact that the downsides of the mechanism, while not 
insignificant, can be effectively managed by the debtor and the creditors. 
Moreover, as the discussion of Pillars 1 and 2 of the UNGPs shows, there is a 
substantial risk that neither the creditors nor the debtor will be able to fully 
meet their/its responsibilities or obligations under the relevant pillar of the 
UNGPs in the context of a sovereign debt crisis. Consequently, they will 
benefit from having an independent, channel through which qualifying 
grievances can be addressed efficiently and fairly. 
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VI. SODRS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE131 
The above discussion suggests that there are gaps in global economic 
governance relating to SODRs. The problem is not just that there is not a third 
party mechanism for coordinating and enforcing sovereign debt workouts. It is 
also that different aspects of the sovereign debt issue are being dealt with in 
different parts of the institutional architecture of global economic governance 
and they are not communicating effectively with each other. 
Thus, the procedural issues of SODR are being deal with on an ad hoc 
basis and in arrangements established by the parties. “Procedural” in this 
context refers to the arrangements for the negotiations between the debtor and 
creditors in an SODR. It includes such issues as the sharing of information and 
how the parties should conduct themselves in these negotiations. It does not 
include “substantive” issues such as the principles that should guide the parties 
in deciding how to share the costs and benefits of the SODR among all the 
stakeholders in the negotiation, and how to account to those stakeholders who 
are adversely affected by the SODR for how they have been affected by the 
SODR. As this article indicates, the IIF and UNCTAD have developed some 
standards that seek to establish some principles to guide the SODR process.132 
However, they focus on procedural concerns and do not deal in any detail with 
the substantive issues that are likely to arise in SODRs. 
The substantive issues that can arise in SODRs can be divided into two 
categories. The first category consists of the economic and financial issues that 
need to be addressed in order to reach a sustainable outcome. These are usually 
dealt with by the parties through negotiation, although the IMF and possibly 
some of the multilateral development banks may play a role in facilitating 
agreement on these issues. At times, other international institutions may play a 
role. For example, the Bank for International Settlement has provided support 
in a number of SODRs,133 and the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank have played a role in the SODRs of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain.134 
The second category consists of the social and political, including human 
rights, issues that arise in SODRs that will influence the sustainability of the 
SODR outcomes. Formally these issues are considered to be the prerogative of 
the sovereign debtor. This means that the sovereign is responsible for making 
the difficult choices about how to allocate, inter alia, the human rights costs of 
the SODR. However, as indicated above, de facto, it is untenable to maintain 
that the creditors and international financial institutions such as the IMF do not 
play a role in these allocative decisions. Moreover, in general terms, the 
 
 131. It is clear that this is a complex topic that cannot be discussed in any great detail in this 
paper. Consequently, this section will focus on how to promote a more integrated and holistic approach 
to the development of international standards applicable to the economic, financial, human rights, social 
and political aspects of SODRs and not on such global governance challenges as the creation of a 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. 
 132. Supra notes 7 and 8. 
 133. Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of 
Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 651 (2009). 
 134. Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 49 (2012); Gianviti et al., supra note 18. 
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international community through such instruments as the UNGPs, the Global 
Compact and the OECD Guidelines has made clear that it thinks that 
businesses, including financial institutions, have a responsibility to deal with 
the human rights impacts of their operations. Nevertheless, in no case, to date, 
has any sovereign debtor or its creditors expressly applied the international 
standards applicable to business and human rights to a SODR, despite the fact 
that some of the debtor states135 have endorsed the UNGPs and some of their 
creditors have expressly acknowledged their human rights responsibilities. 
The fact that these procedural and substantive standards appear to run in 
parallel and appear not to intersect is problematic.136 At the level of the 
individual debtor state, sovereign debt crises are experienced holistically by the 
debtor country and its citizens. However, the fact that the international 
standards like the IIF Principles are taken into consideration by the creditors 
while international standards like the UNGPs are excluded from the SODR 
negotiations means that the human rights aspects of the crisis are unlikely to 
receive the same consideration as the economic and financial factors. The result 
is an over-emphasis on economic and financial considerations and an under-
estimation of the human rights and other social impacts, to the detriment of the 
overall efficacy and sustainability of the SODR.137 
This situation is a symptom of a coordination gap in global governance 
arrangements that allows these two strands of thinking about financial 
interactions to operate in parallel rather than in communication with each other. 
It is possible that this deficiency could be corrected if all states could agree on 
one entity to which to delegate the responsibility to coordinate the development 
of international standards dealing with economics and finance issues and social, 
human rights and cultural matters. Such coordination would ensure that all 
these factors are taken into account in processes, such as SODRs, that are 
ultimately holistic in nature and are experienced as such by their stakeholders. 
While this may result in a SODR process that is more complicated and in 
negotiations between the debtor and creditor that are more difficult, it should 
also ultimately result in outcomes that are more sustainable and seen as more 
legitimate by all stakeholders. 
The existence of this gap is intriguing given that the international 
community recognized the need for coordination between economic and social, 
including human rights, issues when it established the United Nations. The 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was expected to play this 
coordinating role.138 Unfortunately, time has demonstrated that the ECOSOC 
 
 135. The UNGPs were endorsed by consensus by all the member states of the U.N. Human 
Rights Council in 2011. For a list of the participating states, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Year20102011.aspx. 
 136. The one exception to this observation is the UNGA resolution on sovereign debt 
restructuring, see supra note 26. However, it is too early to know if this resolution will have any impact 
on SODRs. In addition, the principles are set out in very general terms which may make them difficult to 
apply in a uniform way in different SODRs. Furthermore, history suggests that neither debtors nor 
creditors look to the UNGA for guidance when engaged in SODRs. 
 137. Concern about the dangers of paying inadequate attention to the social and human rights 
implications of SODRs was raised in Greece. See Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, supra note 5; 
ECtHR, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, supra note 5, para. 47. 
 138. U.N. Charter, Chapter X (Articles 61–72) (Oct 24, 1945), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 
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has not been effective in playing this role.139 In addition, in the SODR context, 
the participants in the coordinating mechanism cannot be limited, like the 
ECOSOC, to states. As this article has shown, non-state actors, such as 
financial institutions are necessary participants in SODRs and thus will need to 
have access to any coordinating mechanism, if it is to be effective. 
Consequently there is a need for a new coordinating mechanism that can assist 
all relevant stakeholders in SODRs in ensuring that all the applicable 
international standards are integrated into the SODR process. Given the general 
complexities of SODRs and the lack of agreement on the need for an 
independent third party mechanism capable of enforcing a SODR outcome, and 
the range of considerations that should be taken into account in an SODR, it is 
unlikely that agreement could be reached on establishing a coordinating 
mechanism that has anything more than advisory powers. Nevertheless such an 
advisory mechanism if it had sufficient expertise and credibility and a 
sufficiently high profile, could play a useful informational role and could shift 
the burden of justifying exclusion of either the procedural or the substantive 
standards from an SODR onto those parties that are resistant to including both 
sets of standards. 
CONCLUSION 
SODRs are complicated transactions. They involve multiple actors with 
conflicting interests and agendas, sophisticated contractual arrangements; 
multiple regulatory environments, complex economic, financial and political 
contexts, and they need to be negotiated under time pressure. They usually 
must be concluded in the glare of publicity even though there are limitations on 
how transparent they can actually be if they are to be concluded relatively 
promptly and effectively. 
The sovereign debtor and its creditors, in addition to dealing with all 
these factors, need to respond to the demands of at least some of the 
stakeholders in the SODRs that their outcomes comply with the evolving 
international norms dealing with the human rights responsibilities of businesses 
and the international legal obligations of sovereign debtors in this regard. The 
UNGPs offer the parties to the SODR, at least in those cases in which 
commercial creditors are involved, a basis for showing that they are responding 
to these demands and the applicable norms and standards. In practice this 
requires the parties to undertake appropriate due diligence, usually in the form 
of ex ante human rights impact assessments. However, as indicated above, in 
the specific context of SODRs there is not sufficient time or possibly the 
resources to fully apply the UNGP requirements, particularly in regard to due 
diligence. This means that both parties will have to do as much due diligence as 
is feasible under the circumstances. As a result, they will have to base their 
decisions on partial knowledge both about current human rights conditions and 
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the likely impact of the SODR on these conditions and the trajectory of these 
impacts over the life of the SODR. Applying the UNGPs, will help the parties 
deal with the risks arising from this situation by making sure that they are 
aware of the human rights impacts of their proposed transaction. In addition, 
their ability to manage these impacts will be enhanced if they implement the 
UNGPs requirement to establish an SODR-specific grievance mechanism. This 
mechanism can address complaints arising from the SODR that the parties may 
not have anticipated and that cannot adequately be dealt with in the applicable 
judicial and administrative forums. 
There are three conclusions that follow from this complicated situation. 
First, the fact that the international standards dealing with business and human 
rights are not expressly taken into account in SODRs is problematic. It 
increases the risk of the debtor and creditors agreeing a SODR outcome that 
over-emphasizes economic and financial considerations and under-emphasizes 
the human rights and other impacts of the SODR. This in turn increases the risk 
that the SODR outcome will be sub-optimal and possibly distorted. This in turn 
risks undermining the legitimacy and sustainability of the SODR. 
Second, the application of the UNGPs to the context of SODR highlights 
an important challenge for human rights laws. It shows that the way in which 
human right issues arise in the context of specific business transactions pose 
new conceptual challenges for human rights law. For example, it is not clear 
that human rights law can give the parties adequate guidance in working out if 
or under what conditions it is acceptable, from a human rights perspective, for 
them to accept short term adverse human rights consequences for inherently 
uncertain long term benefits. Human rights law may also not be able to assist 
them to determine how far they should stretch the lines of causation in 
assessing the cumulative impacts of the SODR. For example, if the SODR is 
shown to have an adverse effect on access to education, should the human 
rights impact assessment consider the likely consequences of the reduced 
access to education on the future employment, health, social welfare and other 
rights of the children who lose access to education and their families? Human 
rights law may also not be able to guide them in assessing how to balance the 
competing claims of different stakeholders in a SODR. For example, it may not 
be able to guide the creditors in deciding if they should attach greater priority to 
the adverse impacts on the people who lose their jobs in the debtor country 
because of the SODR, the people who lose access to health care because of cuts 
in the health budget in the debtor country or the individual bondholders in a 
second country who relied on the representations of the debtor country to 
purchase its debt and now could lose part of their life savings or have their 
monthly incomes cut if the debtor receives debt relief. 
This conclusion makes clear that while the norms and standards in regard 
to business and human rights are well established in the sense that there is 
general consensus that businesses have human rights responsibilities, we are 
still only in the early stages of developing our knowledge about how human 
rights should be applied to businesses and how they should go about fulfilling 
their human rights responsibilities. We are also only beginning to learn how 
states should help businesses fulfill these responsibilities and how this will 
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affect the human rights obligations of states. These are all issues that are in 
need of further research. 
The third conclusion relates to global economic governance. This article 
suggests that there is a cost to be paid for treating the various international 
standards applicable to the process of SODR in isolation from the standards 
applicable to the substantive issues that arise in SODR, such as human rights 
impacts. These different standards need to interact with each and their 
application in specific contexts need to be coordinated to ensure that they 
operate in a mutually supportive fashion. This suggests that there is a need for 
an independent coordinating mechanism that can promote more effective 
coordination between the actors developing these two parallel strands of 
international norms and standards. Determining the precise nature, powers and 
make up of this mechanism requires further research. 
